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States of Nature and States of Mind:
A Generalised Theory of Decision-Making, evaluated by
application to Human Capital Development
By Embrey, I.P.∗
Canonical economic agents act so as to maximise a single,
representative, utility function. However there is accumulat-
ing evidence that heterogeneity in thought-processes may be
an important determinant of individual behaviour. This pa-
per investigates the implications of a vector-valued generali-
sation of the Expected Utility paradigm, which permits agents
either to deliberate as per Homo-economics, or to act impul-
sively. That generalised decision theory is applied to explain
irrational educational investment decisions, persistent social
inequalities, the crowding-out effect, the pervasive influence
of non-cognitive ability on socio-economic outcomes, and the
dynamic relationships between non-cognitive ability, cognitive
ability, and behavioural biases. These results suggest that the
generalised decision theory warrants further investigation.
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Neoclassical Expected Utility Theory explains all individual differences as the re-
sult of heterogeneity in tastes. However there is now compelling evidence that Homo
sapiens also exhibit heterogeneity in thought processes. Camerer, Ho and Chong
(2004) present a convincing case that experimental participants implement one of a
cognitive hierarchy of decision strategies, and Crawford, Costa-Gomes and Iriberri10
(2013) review the experimental literature to conclude that this level-k approach is
now best practice in the modelling of strategic interaction. Empirically, several recent
papers in the consumer choice literature have explicitly rejected the hypothesis that
thought-process heterogeneity can be adequately modelled as if it were taste hetero-
geneity (Swait and Bernardino 2000, Swait and Adamowicz 2001, Hess, Stathopoulos15
and Daly 2012, Kaplan, Shiftan and Bekhor 2012, Vij and Walker 2014). Such evi-
dence can be criticised on the basis that an econometric model with greater degrees
of freedom will always achieve a better fit, however the findings are sufficiently strong
and repeatable to suggest that the theoretical implications of thought-process het-
erogeneity warrant investigation. Accordingly, this paper analyses the implications20
of the simplest possible generalisation of Expected Utility Theory that admits het-
erogeneous thought processes.
The generalised decision theory incorporates two distinct utility formulations, to
represent two distinct thought processes. This approach naturally operationalises the
quintessential human conflict between deliberative and impulsive thought processes,25
which is described by the extensive psychological ‘dual-self’ literature, and which has
recently been popularised by Kahneman (2011) and Peters (2012)1. Thus, under the
proposed model, agents may deliberate as per Homo economicus, but may alterna-
Thanks also to the Economic and Social Research Council for funding my studies (studentship no.
ES/J500094/1).
1For an exposition of the dual-self paradigm see Kahneman and Frederick (2002); for a review
of psychological theories based upon it see Alo´s-Ferrer and Strack (2014); for a discussion of its
neurological and evolutionary justifications see Cohen (2005).
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tively act on impulse, and each agent’s propensity to act deliberatively is modelled
as an individual- and situation-specific probability distribution. This generalised de-30
cision theory sits within the class of general random utility models that was formally
defined by Manski (1977), although it is distinguished from existing theory since the
choice problem generating process is explicitly modelled2.
One application for which heterogeneous thought processes may be particularly
salient is in understanding the educational investment decisions of children. Although35
each of us will, on occasion, act without first considering the consequences of that
action, children are particularly likely to do so; consequently they are particularly
likely to make grossly suboptimal educational investment decisions (Lavecchia, Liu
and Oreopoulos 2015)3. Accordingly, Section II applies the generalised decision the-
ory to model the human capital development process, thereby yielding intuitive yet40
original explanations for several empirical truths. These include: under-investment
in education by a substantial minority of individuals, strong inter-generational per-
sistence of social inequalities, dynamic complementarity between cognitive and non-
cognitive abilities, divergent development pathways dependent upon small changes
in early-life experiences, and an explanation for the observed relationships between45
IQ, Cognitive Reflection (as measured by the Cognitive Reflection Test of Frederick
2005), behavioural biases (including present-bias and risk-aversion), and other social
outcomes (such as health and financial decision-making). These results suggest that
the generalised decision theory has the potential not only to improve our understand-
2In Manski (1977) the choice problem generating process is an arbitrary probability distribution
over the set of possible (choice-set, decision-rule) pairs. When studies such as Costa-Gomes and
Crawford (2006) empirically designate individuals with a particular decision rule, they are implicitly
assuming the existence of some individual- and situation-specific choice problem generating process.
This paper explicitly models that same process, and allows it to evolve as children develop into
adults.
3Other common situations in which unconsidered decision-making is particularly likely include:
intoxication, addiction, sleep deprivation, malnutrition, stress, poverty, and morbidity (Metcalfe
and Mischel 1999, Donohew et al. 2000, Goldman 2012, Mani et al. 2013).
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ing of specific behavioural anomalies, but also to bring together diverse strands from50
the existing literature.
The concept that deliberative thought processes may not always override individ-
uals’ impulsive responses is not new; it was discussed by Plato (ca. 380 B.C.), Smith
(1759), and Marshall (1890) amongst others. However, the psychological literature
has only recently converged toward a default-interventionist paradigm to formalise55
that concept (Evans and Stanovich 2013)4. The default-interventionist paradigm is
also closely aligned with the perspective which Bechara (2005) distils from the neuro-
scientific literature, however it is at odds with all existing economic dual-self theories
(Embrey 2017). Moreover, the existing economic dual-self literature maintains the
Neoclassical assumption of thought-process homogeneity, either by assuming that60
some meta-rational process mediates between the alternative utility formulations
(e.g. Fudenberg and Levine 2006), or by assuming that context alone perfectly de-
termines which utility formulation will predominate (e.g. Thaler and Shefrin 1981).
The proposed model is therefore most closely related to the those of Laibson (2001)
and Bernheim and Rangel (2004), since, although neither is framed as a dual-self65
theory, each describes addiction as an alternative, flawed, decision process. Nev-
ertheless, in those models addictive thinking is triggered whenever an external cue
is received, which leads their authors to focus on a representative and completely
informed agent’s rational response to that situation. By contrast, the present model
emphasises the dynamic consequences of individual heterogeneity in thought pro-70
cesses, for everyday situations where individuals may not even be aware that they
have made a decision, much less possess complete knowledge of their own decision
4Under the default-interventionist description of dual-selves: individuals will act on impulse
unless deliberative reason intervenes in their decision-making. Under the alternative, parallel-
processing, description: individuals always determine both an impulsive and a deliberative opti-
mum, and both thought processes influence every decision.
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processes5. Such situations cannot be characterised by any single representative
agent, unless impulsive and deliberative decision processes happen to coincide.
The model is formally set out in Section I, whereafter Section II discusses its impli-75
cations in the context of the existing literature. Whilst several of those implications
are accommodated only as primitive assumptions in the existing literature, others
are already addressed by a number of competing theories. Such Neoclassical theo-
ries are typically more mathematically elegant than the generalised theory, however
that mathematical elegance should not be mistaken for parsimony. The Neoclassical80
approach requires three layers of assumption: firstly, the set of relevant motivations
is postulated; secondly, a functional form for each motivation is prescribed; finally,
the functional form of a single-valued objective function is also prescribed, whereby
those disparate motivations are assumed to be traded-off against each other. The
generalised approach also requires the first two layers of assumption, but it does85
not impose any homogeneous rule by which disparate motivations must be traded-
off. Thus, ceteris paribus, the law of parsimony would favour the generalised theory
(Ockham ca. 1323); a conclusion which holds a fortiori since that generalised theory
provides an unified explanation for a number of open empirical questions6.
Section III extends the model across the school-to-work transition, and uses it to90
simulate the life-course. This not only enables us to analyse the pathways which
may lead to social exclusion, but also to evaluate hypothetical interventions which
might seek to alter those pathways. Those evaluations lead to a more nuanced ver-
sion of the crowding-out hypothesis, and suggest that each individual’s outcomes
may be substantially determined by social factors, such as the extent to which their95
5If one were to assume the existence of some representative agent with complete self knowledge
of the generalised decision theory presented here, then their ex-ante optimal decision-making could,
indeed, be represented as Neoclassical utility maximisation (Karni and Safra 2016).
6For a more complete comparison of the theoretic merits of each approach see Embrey (2017).
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familial and educational environments enable them to try their best and view mis-
takes positively. That conclusion brings economic understanding closer to the health
inequalities literature, which considers unhealthy decisions to be a downstream prod-
uct of socio-economic determinants, rather than a consequence of heterogeneity in
individual tastes (Graham 2007, Watt 2007).100
I. A Dual-Self Model of Human Capital Development
Agents are assumed to face a series of minor decisions, which cumulatively de-
termine an outcome of interest. This paradigm could apply to health outcomes
(shall I smoke another cigarette? avoid exercise today? eat fast-food rather than
cook?...); employment outcomes (shall I search for jobs this morning? apply for this105
role? prepare for this interview?...); or educational outcomes (shall I attempt today’s
classwork? revise for tomorrow’s test? take up this extra-curricular opportunity?...).
As these examples demonstrate, the complex decisions of traditional economic theory
can often be broken down into series of binary decisions, and so the model presented
here will adopt the simplifying assumption that all such elemental decisions are bi-110
nary. For specificity, this model will investigate educational outcomes, whence the
typical decision will be whether to attempt or avoid a task/opportunity. Never-
theless, Section III will show that the concept of human capital provides a natural
extension of the present theory from educational to employment outcomes.
Each individual decision will be made according to Figure 1, wherein an agent’s115
‘state of mind’ determines which of two standard Expected Utility maximisation
problems will be solved7. Agents therefore respond to an educational opportunity
7The representation used here is subtly distinct from that of Savage (1954), in which states of
nature are predetermined; however it is pragmatically equivalent since its Bayesian Nash equilibria
are given by the same utility maximisation problem. The formal distinction is discussed in Embrey
(2017); however this paper simply adopts the cleaner visual representation.
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either by deliberatively optimising their human capital development, in which case
the right-hand decision tree provides a descriptive theory of their decision-making
process, or by satisfying their impulsive desire, in which case the left-hand decision120
tree provides an as if theory of their decision-making outcome. The generalised
decision theory could therefore be reduced to a Neoclassical model by the imposition
of any functional form by which agents should trade off the disparate motivations
represented by each decision tree8.
Figure 1: A Generalised Decision Framework, Applied to Human Capital Development
Figure 1 models the decision process of agents with imperfect self-control: their125
impulsive decision will be overridden by deliberative preferences only with probabil-
8Superficially, the entirety of Figure 1 could also be framed as a Neoclassical model by defining sit
as an indicator variable for the state of mind of agent i at time t. All agents would therefore maximise
the representative utility function: sit.(Deliberative Payoffs) + (1 − sit).(Impulsive Payoffs). This
approach would be reminiscent of the incentive salience model proposed by Lades (2012).
p ∼ Pit(Xit,Πit, Bi, Hit, Rit, epit) 1−p p
∼ E(U)
pi ∼ Πit(·) pi 1−pi pi 1−pi
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ity pit. An agent’s state of mind is therefore determined according to a realisation
of pit, which may itself be influenced both by the ‘human nature’ of agent i, and
by the specific context of decision t. Pertinent contextual factors could include: the
nature of the potential action, the nature of the outside option, the framing of the130
decision, the influence of peers and adults, and myriad other aspects of the exoge-
nous state of nature. In order to model these contrasting influences, pit is taken
to be a random draw from a distribution Pit(Xit,Πit, Bi, Hit, Rit, e
p
it), which is the
pdf of the agent’s probability of exerting self-control across all potential decision
circumstances. The realised draw therefore manifests all decision-specific contextual135
factors, whilst the distribution Pit(Xit,Πit, Bi, Hit, Rit, e
p
it) describes an agent’s ‘hu-
man nature’ as a function of their current characteristics Xit, cognitive ability Πit,
background Bi, decision history Hit, responsiveness to consequences Rit, and unob-
servable heterogeneity epit. Pit is therefore closely aligned to the psychological trait of
conscientiousness, and will be seen to characterise an agent’s non-cognitive ability.140
Any agent’s action under either thought process is determined by the Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium of its corresponding subgame, which itself is contingent upon the
agent’s believed probability of success at the task in question. The true proba-
bility of success piit of agent i at time t will, for any given task, be drawn from
Πit(Xit, Pit, Bi, Hit, e
pi
it), the agent’s current cognitive ability distribution across pos-145
sible tasks. An agent’s believed probability of success is therefore given by some
decision-weighting function wit(piit, ·), which may also be a function of state variables
Πit, pit, Xit, Bi, Hit. Thus, under either thought process, the task will be attempted
if and only if
wit(piit, ·).[payoff|success] + (1− wit(piit, ·)).[payoff|failure] > [payoff|avoidance]
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Since payoffs are formally defined up to affine transformation, we may normalise the150
payoff of avoidance to be 0 under either thought process9. Thus, for each thought
process, whenever the payoffs to success and failure have the same sign, that sign





[payoff|success]− [payoff|failure] , ·
)
which determines whether the agent will attempt the task, given their current state
variables. pi∗it is well defined, provided the induced map wit(piit) |· is injective for any155
values of ·. This condition is weak, since it is sufficient that ∂wit(piit,·)
∂piit
> 0, which will
hold provided individuals have non-zero awareness of their own cognitive ability.
Thus Πit and Pit parametrise the agent’s current cognitive and non-cognitive abili-
ties respectively, and crucially affect their decision outcome in period t. The period t
decision outcome, in turn, determines Πi,t+1(Hi,t+1, ·) and Pi,t+1(Hi,t+1, ·), according160
to its human capital development implications. An individual’s human capital de-
velopment is therefore modelled as a dynamic process throughout their educational
journey, in which their abilities develop according to the outcomes of many minor
participation decisions.
II. Implications for Human Capital Development165
In order to analyse the implications of this model, it is necessary to impose some
conditions on its payoffs. Firstly, we adopt the standard assumption that agents’
deliberative payoffs reflect the human capital implications of each outcome, less
the opportunity cost of their accrual; this ensures that the generalised model nests
the canonical human capital investment model of Becker (1962, 1964), whenever170
9For simplicity the payoff from task avoidance is assumed to be deterministic, however allowing
a stochastic avoidance payoff would not affect the model’s qualitative implications.
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pit ≡ 1 ∀i, t. Secondly, we impose the strong simplifying assumption that payoffs are
homogeneous for all agents. This serves our present purpose by permitting an analy-
sis of the novel implications of heterogeneity in thought processes, without any con-
founding source of individual differences. Nevertheless, a more realistic model would
admit both sources of heterogeneity. One important capability of a model with both175
sources of heterogeneity would be to analyse the consequences of habit-formation in
impulsive preferences — as per the psychological understanding of Kahneman and
Frederick (2002), and the economic model of Laibson (2001). That analysis is left to
future research.
This paper will now discuss the contribution which the proposed theory can make180
toward our theoretical understanding of six important empirical truths. For each
of those phenomena, this section outlines the limitations of the existing knowledge,
before explaining how the proposed model could overcome those limitations.
Grossly Suboptimal Human Capital Investment
The canonical theory of human capital development as an optimal investment185
decision (due to Becker 1962, 1964) forms the basis of most existing theories of edu-
cational investment. Within that framework, under-investment has been derived as
the result of bounded rationality, credit constraints, and additional behavioural mo-
tivations. Empirically, Jensen (2010) finds that both credit constraints and bounded
rationality (in the form of limited knowledge of the returns to education) are impor-190
tant factors in the Dominican Republic; although credit constraints only affect the
poorest families in that study, and seem not to be a major factor in the developed
world (Oreopoulos 2007). Similarly, Jensen states that limited knowledge is un-
likely to be an important factor in the developed world, and Rouse (2004) finds firm
evidence to support that statement. Nevertheless Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos195
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(2015) survey a large number of nudge-based interventions to find that some succeed
in altering the perceived benefits of post-compulsory eduction, which implies that
bounded rationality could contribute toward under-investment in education.
The foremost behavioural motivation that could lead to under-investment in ed-
ucation is present-bias. This concept has intuitive appeal, as has been articulated200
by Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos (2015), and has strong experimental support (e.g.
Shoda, Mischel and Peake 1990). Nevertheless, Oreopoulos (2007) estimates the
parameters of a standard investment model which incorporates present-bias to find
that an implausibly large degree of bias would be necessary to completely explain
observed under-investment. This is a common challenge for any theoretical approach205
that adapts the canonical utility function: given plausible parameter values, any such
adaptation will be bounded within a certain proximity of the normatively optimal
prediction, yet many individuals make grossly sub-optimal educational investment
decisions (Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker 2000). As an illustrative example, Cunha
and Heckman (2008) incorporate a psychic cost of effort to explain educational un-210
derinvestment, and estimate the implicit value of that cost to be commonly in the
order of $500,000 for college attendance.
One approach which could strengthen the predicted effect of present-bias would be
to incorporate various other, complementary, behavioural motivations. For example,
Wang and Yang (2003) and Ko¨szegi (2006) include a payoff to self-worth within their215
agents’ objective function, which induces a psychic cost of failure within educational
participation decisions. Agents who value self-worth are therefore less likely to at-
tempt educational tasks than those who do not. Analogously, Akerlof and Kranton
(2002) include a payoff to social identity within their objective function, thereby
predicting that those agents who are neither cool enough to fit in with the ‘leading220
crowd’, nor intelligent enough to fit in with the ‘nerds’, might choose to reduce their
12 STATES OF NATURE AND STATES OF MIND NOVEMBER 16, 2017
educational effort such that they fit in with the ‘burnouts’. These highly specific
behavioural motivations are, in outcome, observationally equivalent to an increase
in the opportunity cost of education.
The model proposed in Section I is agnostic about the source of present-bias, but225
proposes an alternative description of its influence in decision-making. Rather than
splicing additional behavioural motivations into the canonical human capital pay-
off function, those motivations are instead considered to constitute an alternative
thought process. In practical terms, individuals are not required to trade-off de-
liberative and impulse motivations in an idiosyncratic manner, but rather have an230
idiosyncratic propensity to act impulsively, as opposed to following a deliberative
thought-process10. The latter approach is aligned with the perspective advanced by
Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos (2015), and this paper demonstrates that it yields
markedly distinct dynamic implications, that is: agents of the latter type do not act
as if they were agents of the former type. The most importantly different impli-235
cation is that, under the generalised theory, the decision outcome for an agent who
acts impulsively could be arbitrarily distant from the normatively optimal outcome;
whence grossly suboptimal decisions are to be expected. Moreover, the effects of
those suboptimal educational effort decisions will be magnified over time, due to
the model’s implied self productivity and dynamic complementarity of cognitive and240
non-cognitive skill development.
Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Skills
An extensive literature has demonstrated that non-cognitive skills are pervasively
important in the determination of socio-economic outcomes (Heckman 2006, Moffitt
10This subtle yet profound distinction is discussed in (Embrey 2017), however its intuition is
analogous to the distinction between a mixed-strategies agent who always acts as x% strategy X
(and 100−x% strategy Y ), and an agent who acts as pure X on x% of occasions.
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et al. 2011, Koch, Nafziger and Nielsen 2015). Nevertheless, there is little consensus245
over the definition of non-cognitive skills (Humphries and Kosse 2017), and no the-
oretical exposition of the mechanism by which they influence individual outcomes.
The proposed decision theory addresses these open questions, by demonstrating that
an individual’s propensity to think deliberatively, Pit, plays a pivotal role in the
determination of their educational and other socio-economic outcomes. This sug-250
gests that Pit represents a fundamental non-cognitive ability — a characterisation
which is closely compatible with the empirical literature surveyed by (Humphries
and Kosse 2017).
To clarify the role of Pit, we shall restrict our attention to valid educational tasks,
that is: tasks where the deliberative (Becker 1962) payoff to participation is positive.255
This is a weak restriction, as the empirical magnitude of the returns to education
is likely to render most educational tasks valid, at least until the end of compulsory
schooling (see, for example: Harmon, Oosterbeek and Walker 2000, Oreopoulos 2007).
Thus (valid) educational task participation is guaranteed under the deliberative
thought process, whence any increase in non-cognitive ability will increase partic-260
ipation likelihood. Similarly, an increase in cognitive ability will increase participa-
tion likelihood, since, under the impulsive way of thinking, tasks with ambiguous




Heckman and Cunha (e.g. 2007, 2010) have established that cognitive and non-
cognitive skills must exhibit both self-productivity and dynamic complementary, in265
order to explain nine key stylised facts of human capital development. However, since
their theoretical models take that dynamic relationship as a primitive assumption,
it is difficult to thereby identify tangible policy or practice implications which could
11This conclusion requires that success  failure on an impulsive level, which is widely known to
be the case (Be´nabou and Tirole 2002). For Πi,t to represent greater cognitive ability than Πj,t it
is sufficient for the latter to stochastically dominate the former.
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intervene in the process of skill formation. This paper contributes to the literature
by providing a mechanism which could generate the aforementioned dynamic rela-270
tionships, and which therefore enables the evaluation of hypothetical interventions.
It has already been seen that increasing either cognitive or non-cognitive ability
will raise an individual’s likelihood of participating in educational tasks. Those tasks,
by definition, develop an individual’s human capital, and so self-productivity and dy-
namic complementarity of cognitive and non-cognitive skills are a direct consequence275
of the proposed model. There are also a number of ancillary mechanisms which would
reinforce those implications. For example, if there is hysteresis in self-control, such
that an individual who exhibits deliberative thinking this period thereby increases
the likelihood of their doing so in future periods, then the ramifications of present
non-cognitive ability would be accentuated. Such Hysteresis could arise through con-280
firmatory bias (Rabin and Schrag 1999), or if impulsive responses develop experien-
tially (Denes-Raj and Epstein 1994). Similarly, if experiencing success in the present
task makes future participation more likely (Be´nabou and Tirole 2002, Wang and
Yang 2003), then the ramifications of present cognitive ability would be accentuated.
That effect would arise if, for example, salience and availability affect individuals’285
subjective success probability (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Table 1 summarises
this discussion by collating its implied skill development consequences for each out-
come12.
12These consequences are uncontentious, save that some existing literature assumes that tasks
develop cognitive ability if and only if success is achieved (e.g. Sjo¨gren and Sa¨llstro¨m 2004, Filippin
and Paccagnella 2012). That view probably arises since those papers conflate skill development
and educational attainment; nevertheless, the Online Appendix demonstrates that the model’s im-
plications remain qualitatively unchanged under that alternative assumption. This paper therefore
adopts my personal view that cognitive ability is developed by attempting educational tasks, rather
than upon receiving a grade for those attempts.
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Table 1: The Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Ability Implications of each Outcome
Avoidance Failure Success
Cognitive: ↓ ↑ ↑
Non-Cog: ↓ ↓ ↑
Persistence in Social Inequalities
Although the importance of persistent social inequality is well-established (Hobcraft290
2002), there is little consensus concerning the mechanisms by which it is perpetu-
ated. Parents, teachers, schools, peers, neighbourhoods, family structure, and fam-
ily finances, have all been found to affect socio-economic outcomes (e.g. Breen and
Jonsson 2005, Carrell et al. 2010, Bradley and Nguyen 2004, Sacerdote 2011, Sparkes
and Glennerster 2002, Kiernan and Hobcraft 2001, Gregg and Machin 2000). Each295
of those factors may therefore contribute toward the observed inter-generational
persistence of social inequality. Convincing evidence in this area is limited, partly
because each of these factors is closely co-determined with other socio-economic vari-
ables (Haveman and Wolfe 1995), but also because the observed effects are probably
the compound result of many mechanisms (Koch, Nafziger and Nielsen 2015). The300
contribution of this paper is to describe one common mechanism which could con-
tribute substantially toward each of the aforementioned effects. It is likely that any
individual’s early-life propensity to think deliberatively will be shaped by each of
the influences listed above, and so those influences will have a lasting effect on skill
accumulation and on the normative quality of decision-making in any context where305
impulsive thought-processes could be expected to favour normatively suboptimal
outcomes. Heller et al. (2017) have recently found strong corroborating evidence for
the importance of any individual’s propensity to deliberate, though they label that
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trait inversely as ‘automaticity’.
Relationships between Abilities and Behaviours310
Impulsive thought-processes could be expected to favour normatively suboptimal
outcomes in contexts such as education, employment, financial, and health decision-
making (Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos 2015, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue 2005).
Thus, under the model presented here, non-cognitive ability levels should be causally
related to individuals’ socio-economic outcomes, through their susceptibility to be-315
havioural bias. This prediction is empirically testable, since the Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT) developed by Frederick (2005) provides a direct measure of individu-
als’ propensity to deliberatively override their impulsive desires. Although there
is limited causal research which tests that prediction, correlations between CRT
scores, various social outcomes, and behavioural biases including present-bias and320
risk-aversion, have repeatedly provided circumstantial support for it (Frederick 2005,
Oechssler, Roider and Schmitz 2009, Toplak, West and Stanovich 2011, 2014, data
from Shenhav, Rand and Greene 2017). Moreover, those behavioural correlations are
“so strong” as to be “begging for a theoretical explanation” (Frederick 2005, p.26).
The model proposed here provides that explanation, and also explains the weaker325
but more widely known correlation between cognitive ability and behavioural bias
susceptibility, in that the dynamic relationships between cognitive and non-cognitive
abilities predict a cross-sectional correlation between those abilities.
Interventions and the Crowding-Out Hypothesis
A large number of studies have attempted to improve individual decision-making330
by intervening with additional, extrinsic, motivations. These studies have produced
inconsistent results (Levitt et al. 2016), which has lead to the development of a
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crowding-out hypothesis: the addition of extrinsic motivations may prevent individ-
uals from considering their intrinsic motivations (Gneezy, Meier and Rey-Biel 2011).
A classic demonstration of this is provided by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), who335
find that the introduction of a charge for any late collection of children from nurseries
led to a significant increase in late collections. There are few theoretical explana-
tions for such perverse behaviour, since, under a standard modelling approach, any
additional incentive unambiguously has the desired effect. One possible explanation
is contributed by Be´nabou and Tirole (2006), who derive a crowding-out effect by340
assuming the existence of a third utility component, which enumerates individu-
als’ social reputation. This innovative approach provides a highly situation-specific
insight to human behaviour, at the cost of an extra layer of assumptions.
The model proposed here provides a parsimonious and direct explanation of the
crowding-out hypothesis: adding an additional extrinsic payoff could cue an unde-345
sirable thought-process. Applied within an educational development context, the
implication is that: where extrinsic rewards or sanctions alter a child’s impulsive
optimum to coincide with their deliberative optimum, short-run cognitive skill de-
velopment will be ensured, but in the long-run this benefit may be offset since that
same intervention could preclude the development of the child’s non-cognitive skill350
(their ability to think deliberatively). This more subtle version of the crowding-out
hypothesis also supports the stereotypical teacher’s intuition that effective inter-
ventions should develop a child’s conscientiousness, both by explicitly teaching and
implicitly demonstrating a deliberative decision-making processes.
Chronic Non-Employment355
Classically, non-employment is studied as a demand-side phenomenon. The the-
oretical literature emphasises its macroeconomic determinants, such as distortions
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or shocks that prevent the labour market from clearing (Pigou 1933, Keynes 1936),
or structural factors, such as stochastic wage offers or imperfect matching tech-
nology (McCall 1970, Mortensen 1970, Pissarides 1990, 2000). More recently, eco-360
nomic theory has explained the observed negative employment outcomes for low-
skilled population subgroups through skill-biased technological change (Autor, Levy
and Murnane 2003), or trade liberalisation (Wood 1995). However none of these
theories can explain why any particular individual should experience chronic non-
employment, unless there is a persistent dearth of accessible job vacancies in their365
area. Empirically, this is not the case in the UK: Only 0.4% of inactive UK individu-
als blame a lack of job vacancies13, and, over the most recently available 12 months of
data, an average of 274 elementary vacancies per month were notified to job centres
in each of the 297 UK Travel To Work Areas14. Yet around 4.7% of UK individuals
fail to gain employment within 24 months of leaving education15, and these individ-370
uals face a substantial risk of chronic non-employment (Gregg 2001). It is therefore
important to develop a supply-side theory which can explain these observations.
The canonical theory of labour supply (originating from Wicksteed 1910) can only
explain non-employment as voluntary. However, it is doubtful whether 4.7% of so-
ciety would deliberately choose the strikingly negative financial and non-pecuniary375
outcomes associated with social exclusion (Hills, Le Grand and Piachaud 2002). In
contrast to most existing theory, this paper emphasises that no individual chooses
their employment outcomes, but rather they choose the effort which is put into
13Jan-March 2017 Labour Force Survey (ONS 2017).
14Moreover, only 28 of those 3,574 month × Travel To Work Area observations reported no new
elementary job vacancies (ONS 2012). This is a conservative estimate of the number of unskilled
job vacancies, since only the Standard Occupational Classifications (SOC2000) ‘elementary’ classi-
fications were included, and since “possibly less than half” of vacancies are reported to job centres
(ONS n.d.).
15Detailed derivation and Stata script available at https://www.researchgate.net/project/
Social-Exclusion-3.
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the job-search process. The job-search process may therefore be modelled by the
theory set out in Section I, in which case individuals could remain chronically and380
involuntarily non-employed as a result of inadequate skill development. Inadequate
non-cognitive ability implies a reduced frequency of identifying and engaging with
application processes, and inadequate cognitive ability implies a reduced standard of
applications, whenever they are attempted.
The direct effect of inadequate skill levels on an individual’s job-search activity385
is likely to be compounded by an indirect effect through educational attainment.
Taken together, it is possible that some individuals might never gain employment,
because the signal that they send to any prospective employer implies that their
marginal contribution to productivity will be below the statutory minimum wage
rate. That possibility represents a natural extension to the standard labour-market390
models of either Spence (1973) or Pissarides (2000), given that this paper predicts
grossly suboptimal levels of educational investment from a substantial minority of
individuals.
III. Simulating the Life-Course
In order to further investigate the implications of the proposed model, this section395
applies it to simulate individual development pathways. Relative levels of cognitive
and non-cognitive ability are generated across multiple periods of educational tasks
and job-search activity, according to the implications that Table 1 summarised for
each potential task outcome. Since we are primarily interested in understanding
social exclusion, we focus here on a uniform commencement of job-search activity at400
the end of a compulsory education period. Job search tasks are modelled by the same
process as educational tasks, save that the probability of success is reduced, and the
duration of each task is increased, to reflect their greater complexity. Additionally,
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once success is achieved in the job market, the resulting employment is modelled as
an absorbing state. Although in reality individuals may lose their jobs, the school-to-405
work transition is crucial in the determination of an individual’s life-course (Bradley
and Nguyen 2004), and the specification of an absorbing employment state allows us
to focus on that transition. Existing theory, such as Pissarides (2000), can provide
a good description of the unemployment which results from subsequent job loss.
This section maintains the assumptions of taste homogeneity, and positive deliber-410
ative participation payoffs for (valid) educational tasks, which were discussed above.
As an additional simplifying assumption, the impulsive payoff for educational tasks
is taken to be negative, which simplifies our analysis by ensuring that tasks will
be attempted if and only if an individual acts deliberatively. In doing so, this as-
sumption excludes the case where task participation is universal, and the case where415
only those with sufficiently high cognitive ability have a positive impulsive payoff to
participation. In both of these cases, individuals with higher cognitive ability have
a greater chance of positive outcomes than their less able peers, and so excluding
these cases only attenuates the self-productivity of cognitive ability. This assumption
therefore represents the most conservative possible approach.420
In order to simulate the model, various distributional and effect magnitude as-
sumptions are also required. These are summarised in Table 2 and discussed in the
Online Appendix, where it is also demonstrated that the qualitative results of the
simulations are robust to changes in any of these assumptions. Many of the assumed
parameters have been made straightforward to manipulate in the Stata code supplied425
at https://www.researchgate.net/project/Social-Exclusion-3.
Figure 2 illustrates the human capital development of 12 ‘median’ individuals across
500 periods of educational decisions, followed by 201 periods of job search16. The
16Median in the sense that all simulated individuals have symmetric prior ability distributions
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As per Filippin and Paccagnella (2012);
Robust to truncated normal;




∆Π [0,+ι] [+ι, 0] [+ι, 0]
∆P [0,+ι] [0,+ι] [+3ι, 0]
The simplest possible parametrisation
of Table 1 that preserves 0.5 as
median ability;
Robust to truncated normal adaptation.
Outcome magnitude ι = 0.5 Robust to parameter variation.
Forgetfulness factor [1− b.ln(∆t)]
As validated by (Rubin 1996);




×4 Robust to parameter variation.
Employment task
relative duration
×3 Robust to parameter variation.
Parametric assumptions for the simulations presented in this paper. In all cases these were also my ‘first guess’
parameter values. A detailed discussion and robustness checks are provided in the Online Appendix.
realised draws from agents’ cognitive ability distributions {piit}t are plotted for each
period until they gain employment, at which point their outcome will become fixed430
at Y . An individual’s history of realised pi values therefore captures the evolution
of their full ability distribution through time. In Figure 2 it can be seen, for exam-
ple, that the variance of these distributions reduces across time for all individuals,
and most markedly so during their early development. This phenomenon is reminis-
cent of the observations which motivated Case-Based Decision Theory (Gilboa and435
Schmeidler 1995). It can also be seen that many individuals (e.g. 6, 9) remain close
to the average ability level of 0.5, whilst others diverge towards much higher or lower
rates of success (eg. 4, 3 rsp.).
around 0.5; see the extended discussion in the Online Appendix.
An extended time horizon would better reflect reality, however Figure 3 shows that 500 periods
is adequate to establish developmental trends, and we are constrained here by legibility.
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Simulated cognitive development outcomes for 500 periods of education, followed by 201 periods of
Job search, during which the outcome jumps to Y if employment is achieved.
Figure 2 also captures the evolution of agents’ non-cognitive ability pit. This can
be read off as the trend in the density of piit realisations, since these are only plotted440
for periods where tasks are attempted. Thus the relationship between cognitive and
non-cognitive skill levels is plain: those individuals with upward-trending cognitive
ability also attempt tasks with increasing frequency, whereas those with downward-
trending success probabilities also exhibit a deteriorating participation likelihood.
This demonstrates that dynamic complementarity and self productivity of cogni-445
tive and non-cognitive skills can indeed explain substantial levels of inequality in
educational outcomes, even for individuals with identical initial ability endowments.
Individuals’ employment outcomes are captured in Figure 2 by the number of
periods between the start of job search (the vertical line) and the achievement of
employment (whereafter outcomes ≡ Y ). It can be seen that individuals 3, 5, and 10450
do not gain employment within 201 periods of job-search, and furthermore that their
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attempts to do so are both irregular and of a low standard. These outcomes contrast
with those of individual 7, who develops high levels of ability and gains a job imme-
diately, and individual 4, who experiences unexpectedly poor job-market outcomes,
but has developed sufficient non-cognitive ability that they persevere without any455
noticeable disengagement. The contrasting outcomes of individuals 3 and 4 substan-
tiate the hypothesis of Duckworth et al. (e.g. 2007) that an individual’s level of grit
may be a key determinant of their life-course.
In order to investigate the origins of the substantial heterogeneity evident above,
Figure 3 presents the average treatment effect for individuals whose first five out-460
comes are exogenously fixed. Panel A shows the average realised cognitive skill levels
{Ei(piit)}t of 200 untreated individuals over the educational phase, and the propor-
tion of those individuals who have gained employment over the job-search phase17.
This panel validates the interpretation of realised pi values as relative ability draws,
since their expected value closely follows 0.5 across the educational phase. During465
job-search the cumulative employment rate of untreated individuals demonstrates
that, whilst most quickly gain employment, 18% of the cohort remain unemployed
after 300 periods of job search. This result reflects reality appropriately well, how-
ever a precise interpretation is not intended as it would necessarily rely on some
conjectured real-world duration for the model’s time periods. Nevertheless, a pre-470
cise comparison between cohorts is appropriate, since each individual in each cohort
has a counterpart in the other cohorts who experiences identical stochastic circum-
stances. Thus panel A provides a perfect counter-factual against which to compare
the treated cohorts.
Panel B of Figure 3 shows the average treatment effect of guaranteed success in each475
17n = 200 was used by Filippin and Paccagnella (2012), and, since Figure 3 shows it to be a
sufficiently large simulation cohort to remove almost all of the noise from average treatment effects,
it is used here also.
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 A:  No Treatment       cf. first 5 periods:
 B:  Success      C:  Failure      D:  Avoidance
Simulated cognitive development outcomes for 500 periods of education, followed by 300 periods of
Job search.
During education: Average realised ability draws for 200 individuals per group,
During job search: % of those individuals who have gained employment.
of the first five periods. This treatment not only produces rapid initial development,
but also leads to a continuing upward trend in relative ability throughout the edu-
cational phase. The resulting improvement in employment outcomes is substantial:
this cohort achieves full employment after 175 periods of job-search.
Panel C shows that the effect of five periods of guaranteed failure is small in the480
long-run, however an initial spike in cognitive skill levels is evident. These obser-
vations are explained by the offsetting effects that experience of failure produces:
cognitive ability is developed at the cost of a reduced likelihood of future partici-
pation18. This finding is of particular interest, since it exposes the ineffectiveness
18The corresponding plot for the evolution of Ei(pit) shows a negative initial spike which is
almost a precise mirror image of that displayed by {Ei(piit)}t in Figure 3C. Since this is the only
instance in which any cohort’s evolution of Ei(pit) differs noticeably from its corresponding Ei(piit)
pathway, the former are not reproduced here, but are available in the Online Appendix.
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of any intervention which provides sufficient extrinsic motivation to ensure that an485
individual attempts tasks, but which fails to thereby improve their conscientious-
ness or intrinsic motivation. Such an intervention might improve that individual’s
academic attainment for as long as it is maintained, but at the cost of a commensu-
rate reduction in relative non-cognitive ability. It is possible that the modern era of
high-stakes school competition might incentivise schools to supply such an interven-490
tion throughout a child’s education, thereby improving their academic performance
at the cost of their non-cognitive development. The detrimental impact of such an
intervention would become manifest only upon school graduation.
Panel D of Figure 3 shows that five periods of initial avoidance could have a
devastating effect on an individual’s developmental pathway. This cohort develops495
markedly lower skill levels during the educational phase, and fewer than half of them
have gained employment by the time that cohort B are fully employed. This is
remarkable, since, at the commencement of job search, the initial five periods of
treatment account for less than 0.2% of the agents’ forgetfulness-adjusted memo-
ries. Nevertheless, the results are in keeping with the empirical literature, which500
has firmly established the importance of early life investment in skill development
(e.g. Cunha, Heckman and Schennach 2010). It is interesting to note that the de-
velopment pathway of a ‘median’ individual who experiences initial disadvantage is
observationally equivalent (after those few periods) to an individual who is endowed
with lower ability levels. Thus, in this model, social factors could explain up to the505
entire variation in observed educational, employment, or health outcomes.
The simulations presented in Figure 4 investigate the extent to which an effective
later intervention could counteract initial disadvantage. An intervention is conceptu-
alised here as an exogenous force which ensures that individuals attempt all tasks. As
such, intervention is guaranteed to improve cognitive ability (the probability of task510
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success), however its effect on non-cognitive ability (the probability of attempting
tasks) is uncertain — individuals’ participation likelihood will increase if and only if
they experience some success. This conceptualisation of an intervention is commen-
surate with the provision of support in the form of encouragement, mentoring, or
academic/job-search assistance, but contrasts with enforced or ‘bribed’ participation515
which could reduce its subjects’ independent participation likelihood. As noted in
the analysis of Figure 3C above, any intervention which failed to develop the intrinsic
participation likelihood of its subjects should, under the present framework, be mod-
elled as guaranteed failure, whereby short-run cognitive benefits would be offset by
non-cognitive losses which would manifest only once the intervention was removed19.520
The grey points in Figure 4 illustrate the baseline outcomes of a cohort of 200
individuals who are disadvantaged by five periods of initial task avoidance. Each set
of coloured points represents a counterfactual cohort which experiences the afore-
mentioned disadvantage, but also 18 periods of effective intervention — hence these
cohorts follow the baseline until the onset of that intervention. It can be seen that525
an intervention starting at period 20 has considerably greater impact than an inter-
vention starting at period 100, although further investigations suggest that rate of
decline in intervention efficacy is quite low thereafter. Where an intervention takes
place during job search, it benefits from the added possibility that some of its sub-
jects’ attempts might successfully result in employment. However, since this is more530
likely to be the case for those individuals who were more likely to gain employment
anyway, the employment rate increases markedly more slowly than that of the base-
19An alternative intervention which guarantees success would be straightforward to programme,
but is difficult to envisage in reality: for example children who suspect that their success has
been falsely inflated tend to suffer reduced confidence, and in any case one cannot sustain false
appearances of success indefinitely. Similarly, the act of providing an individual with a job would
not, in itself, improve their ability to succeed in applying for future jobs (although the human
capital gained whilst in artificial employment might improve future success likelihoods, precisely as
per the intervention modelled here).
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line thereafter. This is a manifestation of the dead-weight loss associated with an
untargeted intervention (Besley and Kanbur 1991).
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Simulated cognitive development outcomes for 500 periods of education, followed by 300 periods of
Job search.
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Figure 4 demonstrates that, within the proposed model, intervention will be con-535
siderably more effectual if it takes place before individuals become trapped into a
downward spiral of deteriorating participation and outcomes. This conclusion was
also reached by Lavecchia, Liu and Oreopoulos (2015) in their survey of the be-
havioural economics of education. It is also worth noting that any individual who
grows up with a familial and social context that is sufficiently supportive so as to en-540
sure perpetual participation, would effectively be in a state of continual intervention.
Thus, even an individual with a particularly low ability endowment would be likely to
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achieve a high level of success if they were socially advantaged. Indeed further anal-
yses suggest that a cohort with an ability endowment corresponding to 200 periods
of initial avoidance could, by period 500, achieve an average ability level in excess of545
any in Figure 3, if they were supported to attempt every educational task thereafter.
Conversely, if an individual’s familial and social circumstances constantly reduce
their likelihood of participation, even a highly effective early intervention could be
overturned if it is not followed up. Thus the proposed model can explain high lev-
els of intergenerational persistence in educational, employment, or health outcomes550
whenever an individual’s background affects their task participation decisions.
These simulations have demonstrated that the proposed model can explain sub-
stantial heterogeneity in individuals’ outcomes as the result of small differences in
their early-life experiences. Further, it has demonstrated that an individual’s propen-
sity to apply an economically rational thought-process could be at least as important555
as their cognitive ability level in the determination of those outcomes. Since these
results were derived despite maintaining the strong assumption of taste homogeneity,
they suggest that heterogeneity in thought processes may indeed be an important
source of individual differences.
The proposed model therefore implies that the environment in which young people560
develop could have far-reaching consequences, independent of any innate individual
characteristics. This conclusion has clear policy implications. One implication is that
parents and educators should attempt to foster supportive home and educational
environments, specifically by encouraging children to try their best and to view
mistakes positively. Another implication is that effective support for new mothers565
and young children could represent an extremely worthwhile investment, and that
such support will be effective whenever it develops those children’s non-cognitive skill
levels; specifically their conscientiousness, openness to experience, and resilience to
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disappointment. Furthermore, those non-cognitive skills should remain a key focus
throughout the educational system. On a practical level, this could be achieved570
by an investigative pedagogy where open tasks predominate, and by an increased
recognition of sports and the arts, since the intrinsic appeal of those activities could
motivate participants to try their best and learn to overcome failure.
IV. Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has responded to the accumulating evidence that Homo sapiens ex-575
hibit heterogeneous thought-processes, by generalising the Neoclassical modelling
approach to admit two distinct utility formulations. Commensurate with the default-
interventionist paradigm, agents’ deliberative reasoning is assumed to override their
impulsive response according to an individual- and situation-specific probability dis-
tribution. This approach is the theoretical dual of the common empirical practice580
that allows each individual to implement any of a finite mixture of possible decision
processes, and it operationalises the much older concept that individuals may act
“variously and accidentally, depending on whether mood, inclination, or self-interest
happens to be uppermost” (Smith 1759, p.276). This paper has demonstrated that
such thought-process heterogeneity can explain substantial individual differences —585
even for agents with homogeneous tastes — a finding which suggests that the Neo-
classical approach may sometimes misrepresent the former source of heterogeneity
as the latter.
Thought-process heterogeneity is an essential feature of any decision situation
wherein individuals may act without first considering the consequences of that ac-590
tion. Such situations include the class of minor decisions that incrementally affect
individuals’ educational, employment, or health outcomes. This paper applied the
generalised decision theory to describe educational investment decisions, and thereby
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provided an explanation for several empirical puzzles. For example, a non-negligible
proportion of society is observed to develop such low human capital that they be-595
come socially excluded: this paper suggests that those individuals never choose that
outcome, but rather that it arose as the cumulative consequence of many minor
decisions, any of which could be determined according to impulsive rather than de-
liberative thought processes.
The proposed model therefore implies that an individual’s propensity to act delib-600
eratively should constitute their fundamental non-cognitive ability. That characteri-
sation contributes the first concrete concrete theoretical description of non-cognitive
ability, and it provides a mechanism by which non-cognitive ability would be a dy-
namic complement of cognitive ability. By endogenising the observed dynamic re-
lationships between cognitive and non-cognitive ability, the proposed model is also605
able to explain each of the nine stylised facts of human capital development listed by
Heckman and Cunha (2010), chief among which is a path dependence within human
capital development in the spirit of Arthur (1992). Such path dependence brings
economic understanding closer to the epidemiological literature, in which an individ-
ual’s outcomes are considered to be determined by their social situation, rather than610
their idiosyncratic tastes.
This paper has also begun to explore the wider applicability of the generalised deci-
sion theory. That exploration has yielded a direct theoretical basis for the crowding-
out hypothesis; namely that the provision of an additional, extrinsic, motivation
may have the perverse effect of cueing an undesirable thought-process. Similarly,615
the empirically puzzling relationships between cognitive ability, non-cognitive abil-
ity, behavioural biases, and socio-economic outcomes were seen to arise as direct
consequences of the generalised decision theory. It therefore seems likely that other
empirical puzzles might also arise as consequences of that theory. For example, it is
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known that factors which appear to be orthogonal to individuals’ tastes, such as the620
font-size of experimental instructions and concurrent cognitive load, can have a signif-
icant influence over decision-outcomes (Alter et al. 2007, Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999).
Although such findings challenge the commonly maintained hypothesis that eco-
nomic agents differ only in their tastes, they are commensurate with those orthogonal
factors’ likely influence on any individual’s propensity to think deliberatively — a625
mechanism which this paper has demonstrated to be a credible source of individual
differences. Further research is therefore needed to explore the implications of the
generalised decision theory more fully.
In many situations, the generalised decision theory is likely to yield little addi-
tional insight over the Neoclassical approach. In particular, it seems reasonable to630
model individuals as agents who maximise one single, representative, utility func-
tion for applications within the traditional economic domain of profit maximisation,
or for any application wherein the theorist seeks to prescribe a normatively opti-
mal trade-off between conflicting motivations. Furthermore, in those situations the
Neoclassical approach will provide a more mathematically elegant solution than its635
generalisation. Nevertheless, this paper has derived original and intuitive explana-
tions for individuals’ observed decision-making in behavioural situations, as a result
of the strictly weaker assumption set which underlies that generalised theory. There-
fore, future theoretical research should explicitly consider whether the Neoclassical
‘single-self’ assumption is appropriate, and, if not, whether the generalised decision640
theory proposed in this paper could better describe their agents’ decision-making.
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